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Australian banks 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 23/2006 
Asokan Anandarajan – Iftekhar Hasan – Cornelia McCarthy 




The objective of this study is to examine whether and to what extent Australian 
banks use loan loss provisions (LLPs) for capital management, earnings 
management and signalling. We examine if there were changes in the use of LLPs 
due to the implementation of banking regulations consistent with the Basel 
Accord of 1988 which made loan loss reserves no longer part of Tier I capital in 
the numerator of the capital adequacy ratio. We find some evidence to indicate 
that Australian banks use LLPs for capital management, but no evidence of a 
change in this behaviour after the implementation of the Basel Accord. Our results 
indicate that banks in Australia use LLPs to manage earnings. Further, listed 
commercial banks engage more aggressively in earnings management using LLPs 
than unlisted commercial banks. We also find that earnings management 
behaviour is more pronounced in the post-Basel period. Overall, we find a 
significant understating of LLPs in the post-Basel period relative to the pre-Basel 
period. This indicates that reported earnings may not reflect the true economic 
reality underlying those numbers. Finally, Australian banks do not appear to use 
LLPs for signalling future intentions of higher earnings to investors. 
 
Key words: capital management, earnings management, signalling, Australian 
banks 
 
JEL classification numbers: C23, G14, M41  
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Luottotappiovarausten käyttö, tulosjohtaminen ja 
signalointi australialaisissa pankeissa 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 23/2006 
Asokan Anandarajan – Iftekhar Hasan – Cornelia McCarthy 




Tässä tutkimuksessa pyritään tarkastelemaan luottotappiovarausten käyttöä, tulos-
hallintaa ja viestittämistä australialaisissa pankeissa. Työssä tarkastellaan erityi-
sesti, muuttuiko pankkien luottotappiovarausten käyttö, kun vuoden 1988 Baselin 
sopimuksen mukainen pankkisäätely toteutettiin Australiassa. Tuolloisen Baselin 
sopimuksen mukaan luottotappiovarauksia ei enää luokiteltu ykköstason pää-
omaksi pankin vakavaraisuussuhdetta laskettaessa. Tutkimuksessa esitetyn näytön 
mukaan australialaiset pankit käyttävät luottotappiovarauksia omaisuuden hoidos-
sa, mutta eivät muuttaneet käyttäytymistään tässä suhteessa vuoden 1988 Baselin 
sopimuksen voimaantulon jälkeen. Australialaiset pankit eivät nähtävästi myös-
kään käytä luottotappiovarauksia viestiäkseen sijoittajille tulonäkymien parantu-
misesta. Sen sijaan tulokset viittaavat siihen, että ne käyttävät luottotappiovarauk-
sia tulosjohtamisessaan. Lisäksi listautuneet yksityiset pankit käyttävät luotto-
tappiovarauksia tulosjohtamisessa aggressiivisemmin kuin listautumattomat yksi-
tyiset pankit. Pankkien käyttäytyminen on myös voimakkaammin painottunut 
tulosjohtamiseen vuoden 1988 Baselin sopimuksen voimaantulon jälkeen kuin sitä 
ennen. Kaiken kaikkiaan australialaiset pankit ilmoittavat luottotappiovarauksensa 
aiempaan nähden liian vähäisiksi vuoden 1988 jälkeen. Tämä viittaa siihen, että 
pankkien julkaisemat tulokset eivät ehkä ole sopusoinnussa taustalla olevien 
taloudellisten realiteettien kanssa. 
 
Avainsanat: omaisuuden hoito, tulosjohtaminen, viestittäminen, australialaiset 
pankit 
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Loan loss provisions (LLPs) are expected to reflect anticipated losses by bank 
managers. However, federal banks and securities regulators recognize that the 
provisions cannot accurately match actual losses and can include a margin for 
imprecision (see Montgomery, 1998). This margin for imprecision (referred to as 
the discretionary component of the allowance) has been exploited by banks. 
Previous researchers, most of whom concentrated on financial institutions in the 
United States and Europe, concluded that at one stage or another, LLPs were used 
as a tool for capital management (see Kim and Kross, 1998; Collins et al, 1995; 
Moyer, 1990; among others), for earnings management (see Ahmed et al, 1999; 
Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo, 1995; Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988; among 
others) and for signalling future intentions to the stock market (Liu and Ryan, 
1995; Wahlen, 1994). 
  To date, there is no research that examines if and how Australian banks use 
LLPs as a tool for managing risk, reducing earnings volatility, and signalling 
future changes in earnings. It is important to understand whether Australian banks 
use LLPs as a tool to meet one or a combination of these objectives. It is of 
particular importance to regulators in Australia, because it would help them to 
discern whether reported accounting numbers reflect the true economic reality of 
the underlying risk conditions. Hence, in this paper we examine whether 
Australian banks use LLPs for any of these purposes. 
  Changes in capital adequacy regulation in 1990 provided the impetus for 
research on how US financial institutions use LLPs. Research on European bank 
behaviour followed the implementation of the Basel Accord of 1988. These US 
and European changes in capital adequacy regulations form a common strand with 
respect to the use of LLPs. Prior to these changes the total amount of a bank’s 
LLPs was included in the numerator of the ratio used by regulators to compute a 
bank’s ‘capital adequacy’. Evidence suggests that for the US and European 
countries, this arrangement acted as a constraint on the use of LLPs for capital and 
earnings management. For example, with the introduction of this regulation, 
reducing LLPs for the purpose of increasing earnings would lower the bank’s 
capital adequacy ratio, thus acting as a disincentive for banks with low capital 
adequacy ratios. Similarly, increasing LLPs would improve the bank’s capital 
adequacy ratio but would also cause reported earnings to be lower. Earnings 
management could only be achieved at the expense of risk management and vice 
versa. The US act of 1990 and the Basel Accord of 1988 eliminated this imbroglio 
because they both reduce the direct role of loan loss reserves in the numerator of 
the capital adequacy ratio. As noted by Ahmed et al (1999) with this change, 
earnings management could now be achieved without costs. Several researchers 
examined if the new rules in the US and Europe affected the use of LLPs for  
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capital management, caused banks to adopt more aggressive earnings 
management techniques, and the use of LLPs for signalling. 
  There is no significant difference between the US capital adequacy 
regulations of 1990, the requirements of the Basel Accord of 1988, and the rules 
currently administered in Australia. The current rules in Australia were 
implemented in the 1990s and require Australian banks to follow the capital 
adequacy requirements of the Basel Accord of 1988. Therefore, we refer to the 
current regime in Australia as the post-Basel period. While there is no research 
that specifically examines how the post-Basel capital regulations changed the way 
Australian banks use LLPs for capital management, earnings management and 
signalling, there is some research on other aspects of Australian banking. Ford and 
Weston (2001) focused on performance of Australian bank stocks over the post-
Basel period, and found evidence of low returns and high volatility. They noted 
that in the post-Basel period, Australian banks incurred large asset write-downs on 
non-performing loans following poor lending practices. Ford and Weston (2003) 
argued that research on the impact of the post-Basel regulations on transparency 
in financial reporting by banks is necessary. They wrote, ‘One area where this is 
most apparent is the provisioning for loan losses. Revisions to loan loss reserves 
represent charges against earnings for the period in which they are recognized. An 
increase in LLPs in line with deterioration in loan quality will reduce the retained 
earnings of the bank entity. Weaker banks face a strong incentive to understate 
LLPs because, under the Basel Accord risk based capital requirements, retained 
earnings are counted as core (Tier I) capital while loan loss reserves are counted 
as supplementary (Tier II) capital up to 1.25% of banks’ risk weighted assets 
(Ford and Weston, 2003, p. 13)’. 
  As mentioned above, work was done on how the new rules in the US and 
Europe affected the use of LLPs for capital management, earnings management 
and signalling. One important paper in this area, Ahmed et al (1999), examined 
how bank managers in the US used LLPs to manage capital and earnings and to 
signal markets of future earnings changes. Ahmed et al (1999) developed a model 
and estimated it using OLS regressions that included various dummy variables 
and interaction terms to exploit the regulation changes. In this study we use an 
approach similar to that of Ahmed et al (1999) to examine if Australian bank 
managers use LLPs for the same purposes. However, it should be noted that we 
did not replicate the Ahmed et al (1999) methodology. As will be discussed later 
in the paper, our alterations to the Ahmed et al (1999) approach were made 
primarily to accommodate our much smaller sample (50 commercial banks with 
only 10 listed). 
  The second section of this paper discusses capital adequacy regulation in 
Australia in greater detail. Section 3 discusses relevant prior literature. In Section 
4 we state our hypotheses. The model specifications and the variables used in this  
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study along with a description of our data are provided in Section 5. Section 6 
discusses our empirical results. We present our conclusions in Section 7. 
 
 
2  Capital adequacy regulation in Australia 
In Australia, banks are regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA) established in 1998. The creation of the APRA was one of the 
recommendations of the Wallis Inquiry of 1996, which sought to make major 
changes to the regulatory framework of the Australian financial system.
1 The 
other key changes recommended by the Wallis report and adopted by the 
government do not impinge on this study and hence are not discussed here. Prior 
to the establishment of the APRA, prudential supervision of the Australian 
financial system was organized around institution type, with separate agencies 
(the Reserve bank and the Insurance and Superannuation Commission, among 
others) regulating the activities of each class of financial institution. The 
amalgamation of these separate prudential agencies into a single entity was a 
major change in the regulatory framework pertinent to this study. The APRA 
required all banks to adopt the requirements of the Basel Accord of 1988. 
Published research indicates that as of 1996, all Australian banks had adopted the 
Basel Accord guidelines (see Padoa-Schioppa, 1996).
2 There is no evidence that 
all Australian banks adopted at the same time, but we use 1996 as the cut off date 
because as stated in the Padoa-Schioppa (1996) paper the bulk of banks adopted 
around this time. 
  Capital adequacy refers to the amount of capital held by Australian depository 
institutions (ADIs) to cover losses. The APRA currently requires capital adequacy 
requirements for ADIs to be based on the Bank for International Settlements Basel 
Committee for Banking Supervision (1988) International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards, commonly known as the Basel Accord. The 
intention of the Basel Accord was to ensure that a consistent standard be applied 
when determining minimum capital requirements across internationally active 
banks. Under the rules of the Basel Accord, capital for supervisory purposes is 
now considered in two tiers: Tier I and Tier II. Tier I (core capital) comprises the 
highest-quality capital elements. A bank’s capital base is the sum of its Tier I and 
Tier II capital less any deductions. At least 50% of a bank’s capital base must be 
                                                 
1 The Commonwealth Government established the Wallis Inquiry in 1996 and the Financial 
System Inquiry Final Report was published in 1997. 
2 Padoa-Schioppa (1996) noted that the results of a survey involving 129 countries showed that 
most non-Basel member countries had adopted the guidelines during the period 1992–1996 though 
the implementation year for each country varied. Most banks, including those in Australia, adopted 
closer to 1996; by 1996 all banks had adopted the guidelines. Therefore, we refer to the period 
before 1996 as the pre-Basel period and the period starting in 1996 as the post- Basel period.  
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Tier I capital. The Basel Accord requires that the ratio of a bank’s capital to risk 
weighted assets (referred to as the capital adequacy ratio) must be at least 8%.
3 
  It is of interest to this study that in both the pre- and post-Basel periods, 
retained earnings are included in the numerator of the capital adequacy ratio. In 
the pre-Basel period, the numerator of the capital adequacy ratio also included the 
entire amount of a bank’s LLPs (referred to in the Australian regulation as general 
provision for doubtful accounts). Under these conditions, a decrease (increase) in 
LLPs would result in no change in the numerator but would decrease (increase) a 
bank’s capital adequacy ratio. This meant that in the pre-Basel period, LLPs acted 
as a constraint to earnings management. As mentioned above, in the post-Basel 
period a bank’s LLPs are not part of Tier I capital and are only an insignificant 
part of Tier II capital; thus, increasing or reducing the LLPs for the purpose of 
managing earnings has no effect on the capital adequacy ratio. 
  The mechanism of the double entry and the impact of decreasing LLPs are 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
3 Tier I capital is defined as the sum of book value of equity (common stock and retained 
earnings), qualifying non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock, and minority interest in equity 
accounts of subsidiaries less goodwill and other tangible assets. Tier II capital is made up of other 
elements that contribute to the overall strength of a bank as a going concern but do not satisfy all 
of the characteristics of Tier I capital. Tier II capital is the sum of loan loss reserves (up to a 
maximum of 1.25% of risk weighted assets), perpetual preferred stock, hybrid capital instruments, 
perpetual debt, mandatory convertible debt securities, term subordinated debt, and intermediate 
preferred stock.  
11 
Figure 1.  Impact of reduction in loan loss provisions on 
      numerator and denominator of the capital 
      adequacy ratio pre-basel and post-basel 
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In the pre-Basel period, the full amount of LLP is included in the numerator of the Capital Adequacy Ratio. In the post-Basel period, 
LLP is included in Tier II capital up to a limit of 1.25% of the risk weighted assets and the numerator of the Capital Adequacy Ratio is 
the sum of Tier I and Tier II less any deductions. 
 
 
3 Literature  review 
Our study examines capital management, earnings management and signalling by 
Australian banks. We now discuss the findings of relevant prior studies in these 
three areas. Table 1 provides a summary of these papers. 
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Table 1.   Summary of the findings of prior studies 
 
Panel A: Studies that examined the association of LLPs with capital management 
Authors  Research Question Examined  Findings 
Studies that use data from before the change in capital adequacy regulation 
Moyer (1990) 
Scholes et al (1990) 
Are accounting adjustments 
using LLPs, loan charge-offs 
and securities gains and losses 
utilized for capital ratio 
management? 
LLPs are used as a tool for capital management.  In 
particular, banks use LLPs to manage capital ratios 
and prevent it falling below the minimum desired level.  
However, banks do not use loan write-offs for this 
purpose. 
Beatty et al (1995)  How do banks alter the timing 
and magnitude of transactions 
and accruals to achieve capital 
management? 
Managers’ accrual decisions are complicated by other 
capital-raising activities.  However, loan charge-offs 
and LLPs are used as mechanisms for capital 
management. 
Collins et al (1995)  How are loan charge-offs, 
securities issuances, and LLPs 
used as tools for capital 
management? 
Main difference between this study and Moyer (1990) 
is that the authors find that while loan write offs are 
used as a tool for managing capital ratios, LLPs are 
not. 
Studies that use data from after the change in capital adequacy regulation 
Kim and Kross (1998)  What is the relationship 
between LLPs and capital ratio 
management after the 1989 
capital regulation came into 
effect? 
The authors found that after the new regulation there 
was no significant association between LLPs and 
capital management.  They found that banks with low 
capital ratios show lower LLPs post 1989 regulation 
relative to the pre 1989 period. 
Ahmed et al (1999)  What is the association of LLP 
with capital management, pre 
and post 1989 capital adequacy 
regulation? 
Ahmed et al (1999) found a negative relationship 
between LLPs and the ratio of actual regulatory capital 
(primary or Tier I capital) before loan loss reserves to 
the minimum required regulatory capital and 
unexpectedly found no change in this association after 




Table 1. (continued) 
 
Panel B: Studies that examined association of LLPs with earnings management 
Authors Research  Question 
Examined 
Findings 
Studies that found positive association 
Ma (1988)  Do banks utilize LLPs to 
smooth reported 
earnings? 
Both LLPs and charge-offs are used as mechanisms to smooth 
earnings. 
Collins et al. 
(1995) 
How are loan charge-
offs, securities 
issuances, and LLPs 
used as tools for 
earnings management? 
Found only LLPs used as a tool to manage earnings. 
Greenawalt and 
Sinkey (1988) 
Are LLPs used to 
smooth income?  If so, 
does income smoothing 
behaviour differ by bank 
type? 
After controlling for characteristics of banks’ portfolios and 
economic environment, they conclude that LLPs are used to 
smooth earnings.  Further, regional banks tend to engage in 
income smoothing using LLPs more aggressively than money 
centred banks. 
Bhat (1996)  Do banks engage in 
earnings management 
using LLPs, if so what 
are the characteristics of 
those banks engaging in 
earnings management? 
Banks that manage earnings and engage in income smoothing 
using LLPs are characterized by low growth, low book to asset 
ratio, high loans to deposit ratio, high debt to asset ratio, and low 
return on assets. 
Studies that found no association 
Wetmore and 
Brick (1994) 
What factors are 
associated with income 
smoothing by banks? 
With reference to LLPs, found no evidence that LLPs are used as a 
tool for earnings management. 
Beatty et al. 
(1995) 
How do banks alter 
timing and magnitude of 
transactions and 
accruals to achieve 
earnings management? 
Found no association between LLPs and earnings management by 
the banks in their sample 
Ahmed et al. 
(1998) 
Do banks use LLPs as a 
tool for earnings 
management after the 
1990 change in capital 
adequacy regulation 
came into effect? 
Found no evidence that LLPs are used as a tool for earnings 
management post 1990 capital adequacy regulation. 
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Table 1. (continued) 
 
Panel C: Studies that examined the use of LLPs as signalling mechanism 
Authors Research  question 
examined 
Findings 
Beaver et al 
(1989) 
Wahlen (1994) 
How do investors react to 
unexpected increases in 
LLPs by banks? 
Beaver et al (1989) found that, after, controlling for 
nonperforming loans, banks with higher allowances for loan 
losses have higher market to book ratios. 
Wahlen (1994) found that, after controlling for unexpected 
changes in non-performing loans, banks with higher 
unexpected LLPs have higher abnormal returns. 
Both conclude that, among other findings, unexpected 
increases in LLPs are viewed positively by investors 
Liu and Ryan 
(1995) 
How does a bank’s financial 
condition influence the signal 
sent by changes in LLPs? Is 
the banks’ financial condition 
a moderating variable? 
They concluded that LLP increases are good news only for 
banks that the market perceives to have loan default problems; 
if prognosis is already good, no significant stock market 
reaction occurs. 
Beaver and Engel 
(1996) 
Does the capital market 
assign different prices to 
estimates of the two 
components of loan losses? 
(ie, discretionary and 
nondiscretionary 
components, surrogating for 
discretionary and 
nondiscretionary behaviour). 
Built on prior studies but 
refined methodology by 
breaking down LLPs into two 
components. 
They found that the capital market assigns significantly 
different prices to each component. Nondiscretionary 
components are negatively priced and discretionary 
components are positively priced. Conclude that increases in 
discretionary components of LLPs are viewed as good news 
items. 
Liu et al (1997)  How are the characteristics 
of banks that utilize 
discretionary LLPs for 
signalling? 
The good news signalled by discretionary LLPs are most 
prominent for banks that have greater incentive to signal good 
news, namely, banks characterized by low regulatory capital 
and potential loan default problems. 
Griffen and 
Wallach (1991) 
Elliott et al (1991) 
Did stock market react to 
disclosures about decisions 
to increase loan loss 
reserves for Latin American 
governments to recognize 
higher probability of default? 
Griffen and Wallach (1991) found that the stock market reacted 
positively to announcements of additional LLPs. They conclude 
that this is consistent with banks’ use of LLPs as credible 
signals about their intentions, ability, and resolve to solve the 
Latin American debt situation. 
Elliott et al (1991) came to the same finding. They concluded 
that an increase in LLPs is considered good news because 
they imply that a bank is dealing constructively with loan default 
problems 
Ahmed et al. 
(1999) 
Are LLPs used as a tool for 
signalling? 
Found results that conflicted with Wahlen (1994) and Beaver 
and Engel, (1996) discussed above.  The difference in results 
may be attributed to the difference in the time periods covered 
by the studies 
 
 
3.1  Studies that examined the association of LLPs and 
capital management 
Studies in the area of capital management can be dichotomised into those that 
examined the association before the capital adequacy regulation change and those 
that examined association after said change. Prior to 1989, there was an incentive 
to manipulate LLPs to improve the capital adequacy ratio. However, studies that  
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examined how banks used LLPs during this period produced conflicting results. 
Moyer (1990) and Scholes et al (1990) examined the use of LLPs and other 
related tools for capital management. They found that banks used LLPs by 
inflating loan loss reserves when capital levels were close to violating minimum 
capital regulations. They did not find significant association with other tools, such 
as charge-offs. Beatty et al (1995) concluded that, while managers’ accrual 
decisions are complicated by other capital-raising activities, loan charge-offs and 
LLPs are used as mechanisms of capital management. Collins et al (1995) found 
the opposite results; namely that while tools such as charge-offs were associated 
with capital management, LLPs were not. 
  Two studies that examined the association of LLPs with capital management 
after the new regulation came into effect are Kim and Kross (1998) and Ahmed et 
al (1999). Kim and Kross (1998) found no association. This result is not 
surprising since under the new regulation loan loss reserves are no longer a 
component of the capital adequacy ratio. Ahmed et al (1999) found a negative 
relationship between LLPs and the ratio of actual regulatory capital (primary or 
Tier I capital) before loan loss reserves to the minimum required regulatory 
capital and unexpectedly found no change in this association after the change in 
U.S. capital regulations. 
 
 
3.2  Studies that examined the association of LLPs and 
earnings management 
Overall, the results on the association of LLPs and earnings management are 
conflicting. Ma (1988) examined if LLPs were used as a tool to reduce volatility 
of earnings by banks. He concluded that LLPs, together with loan charge-offs, 
were used by banks for income smoothing. Collins et al (1995) examined whether, 
in addition to LLPs, other tools such as loan charge-offs and securities issuances 
were used for earnings management. They found a positive association only 
between LLPs and earnings management, and concluded that the other tools were 
used primarily for capital management. Some studies sought to examine the 
characteristics of banks that indulged in earnings management. Greenawalt and 
Sinkey (1988) found that regional banks engaged in more aggressive income 
smoothing than money-centred banks. Bhat (1996) found that banks that engaged 
in aggressive income smoothing were in poorer financial health relative to others. 
All these studies had one common feature: they all found a positive association 
between LLPs and earnings management. 
  Other studies found no association between LLPs and earnings. Wetmore and 
Brick (1994) studied what factors might be associated with income smoothing by 
banks and found no evidence that LLPs were used as a tool for earnings  
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management. Beatty et al (1995) considered whether banks alter timing and 
magnitude of transactions and accruals to achieve earnings management, but 
found no association between LLPs and earnings management by the banks in 
their sample. Ahmed et al (1999), the only study to use data that included the 
period after the change in capital adequacy regulations, also found no evidence 
that banks used LLPs to manage earnings. Their finding of no association was 
surprising, since the capital adequacy regulation removed the costs of earnings 
management. Ahmed et al (1999), however, attribute this difference in result to, 
perhaps, the different model used in their study. 
 
 
3.3  Studies that examined the use of LLPs as a tool for 
signalling 
Some prior studies examined whether LLPs are used as a signalling device to 
clients and investors regarding future expected cash flow. These studies also 
decomposed LLPs into discretionary and nondiscretionary components. Most 
studies concluded that stock returns were negatively related to normal LLPs and 
positively related to abnormal LLPs (see Beaver et al, 1989; Wahlen, 1994; Liu 
and Ryan, 1995; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Liu et al, 1997). Griffen and Wallach 
(1991) and Elliott et al (1991) concluded that when the LLPs were related to Latin 
American countries, an increase in LLPs was viewed by the bank positively. They 
concluded that the market considered it as good news because the banks were 
dealing constructively with government loan default problems. In contrast to these 
other studies Ahmed et al (1999) found that LLPs were not used for signalling. 
They found a negative relationship between LLPs and future earnings for both 
total LLPs and for non-discretionary provisions. Therefore, their results contradict 
those of Wahlen (1994). They also found evidence that contradicted the 
conclusion of a positive relationship between market value of equity and 




4.1 Capital  management 
As mentioned above, Moyer (1990) and Ahmed et al (1999), using financial data 
on banks in Europe and the U.S., found that in the pre-Basel era banks used loan 
loss reserves for the purpose of managing capital adequacy ratios. Given that in 
the post-Basel period, loan loss reserves are not included in Tier I capital and can  
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make only a limited contribution to Tier II, capital changes in LLPs have no 
impact on the capital adequacy ratio. Accordingly, Ahmed et al (1999) 
hypothesized that in the post-Basel period there would be a less negative 
relationship between LLPs and capital but found no evidence to support this 
hypothesis. Since Australian banks have also adopted the guidelines of the Basel 
Accord, there is no reason to expect a divergence in US, European and Australian 
bank behaviour. Our hypothesis, stated in the alternate, is as follows: 
 
H1: The relation between loan loss provisions and primary (Tier I) capital for 
commercial banks will be less negative in the post-Basel regime relative to 
the pre-Basel regime. 
 
Ahmed et al (1999) tested two other hypotheses dealing with whether the 
association between the cost of violating capital constraints and capital 
management was less negative in the post- Basel regime. To do this they broke 
down their Tier II sample into banks with loan loss reserves in excess of 1.25% of 
risk weighted assets versus those with 1.25% or less. We could not do this 
because our sample was limited to only 50 commercial banks, of which only 10 
were listed. Ahmed et al (1999) had a total of 113 banks in their sample. 
 
 
4.2 Earnings  management 
There are many ways to define earnings management. We follow Ahmed et al 
(1999) and define it as smoothing earnings. We look at the relationship between 
LLPs and earnings before taxes and LLPs as done in Ahmed et al (1999). 
  The inherent assumption is that managers have an incentive to engage in 
earnings management. Since reduced volatility is assumed to convey a signal of 
lower risk, less volatile earnings are a fundamental predicate for stable stock 
prices (see Greenawalt and Sinkey, 1988; Beatty et al, 1995; Collins et al, 1995; 
Ahmed et al, 1999). As mentioned in the prior section, in the post-Basel regime, 
LLPs are not included in Tier I capital and can make only a limited contribution to 
Tier II capital, changes in LLPs will not change the capital adequacy ratio; 
therefore, there is no constraint or costs associated with earnings management. 
Hence, we would expect more aggressive earnings management in the post-Basel 
period. Evidence of this behaviour has been witnessed in countries representing 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a Paris-
based, European-dominated organization (Ford and Weston, 2003), and in Asian 
countries (Delhaise, 1998). In Australia, we posit that commercial banks have an 
incentive to engage in earnings management to send a reassuring signal to 
investors. Our hypothesis, stated in the alternate, is as follows:  
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H2: The relation between loan loss provisions and earnings (before loan loss 
provisions) will be more positive in the post-Basel regime relative to the pre-
Basel regime. 
 
In the economic literature it is argued that corporate decisions are affected by the 
type of corporate ownership (Rozeff, 1982; Kim and Sorensen, 1986). In 
particular, a high correlation was observed between the vested interest of an 
individual and firm performance (Rosen and Quarrey, 1987; Oswald and Jahera, 
1991). This can be explained by agency theory, which suggests that managers 
acting as agents for owners exhibit tendencies to pursue strategies that meet their 
own goals, rather than those of the owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 
1980). With respect to this study, listed commercial banks are monitored more 
carefully by regulators. Managers acting as agents for the owners of banks are 
under more pressure to post higher returns for the company. Most owners try to 
provide incentives to managers by incorporating ‘pay for performance’ 
compensation contracts based on average performance over a short period of time 
(Core and Gauy, 2002; Yermack, 1995). Holderness and Sheehan (1988) and 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) note that this type of performance measure is common 
in most publicly-traded companies, including listed commercial banks. Hasan and 
Lozano-Vivas (2002) note that for non-traded institutions, given the lack of direct 
monitoring and pressure, managers may have different goals and strategies 
relative to the managers of traded institutions. This applies to unlisted commercial 
banks as well. In this study, we assume that listed commercial banks will have a 
vested interest in reporting stable income numbers due to the fact they obtain 
capital by issuing shares; unlisted commercial banks do not. We infer from this 
interest, based on the theory discussed above, that listed commercial banks may 
have a much greater incentive to engage in earnings management to convey a 
signal of stability to investors. Hence, we propose an additional hypothesis on 
earnings management stated in the alternate form as follows: 
 
H2a:  The relation between loan loss provisions and earnings (before loan loss 
provisions) will be more positive for listed commercial banks relative to 
unlisted commercial banks. 
 
Finally, we infer that this difference between listed and unlisted commercial banks 
will be more pronounced in the post-Basel period relative to the pre-Basel period. 
Hence, out next hypothesis, stated in the alternate, is as follows. 
 
H2b:  The relation between loan loss provisions and earnings (before loan loss 
provisions) will be more positive for listed commercial banks relative to 
unlisted commercial banks in the post-Basel period.  
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4.3 Signalling 
Management uses various tools to signal intent. The literature notes that a motive 
for the choice of LLPs is to signal financial strength (Beaver et al, 1989; Wahlen, 
1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Ahmed et al, 1999). Signalling theory postulates 
that increases in LLPs are used to signal good news about future earnings 
changes. In particular additional LLPs convey a signal of conservatism and 
confidence that management can withstand a ‘hit’ to earnings. Ahmed et al (1999) 
note that signalling is an important reason for choosing LLPs. Our hypothesis, 
stated in the alternate form, is as follows: 
 
H3: Loan loss provisions are positively related to one-year-ahead changes in 
earnings before loan loss provisions. 
 
 
5  Data and model specifications 
5.1 Data 
We used the data from bank financial statements provided by Thomson’s (Bureau 
van Dijk) Bankscope database. This, also known as Fitch’s International Bank 
Database, required substantial editing before a reliable sample could be 
constructed.
4 The data were carefully reviewed to avoid double counting of 
institutions, to ensure that the banks reported according to the same accounting 
standards, and to exclude various types of non-bank financial institutions. We use 
the following criteria to obtain a cleaner sample. First, data from the consolidated 
bank or bank holding company was used whenever more than one set of accounts 
was provided. Second, IAS data were used wherever available and, if this was not 
available, inflation-adjusted local accounting standards data were used. Third, 
commercial banks with incomplete data with respect to our key variables were 
excluded from the sample. Finally, central banks, government development banks, 
export-import banks and cooperative banks were excluded from the sample. Our 
final data set consists of annual end-of-year information for all Australian 
commercial banks covering the period 1991 to 2001. The final sample comprised 
a total of 50 commercial banks, of which 10 are listed and 40 are unlisted. The 
                                                 
4 Problems encountered included multiple listing of commercial banks, and double reporting by 
some banks using both international accounting standards (IAS) and domestic accounting 
practices. In addition, the problems in the latter case were compounded because multiple entries 
often reflected different levels of consolidation. Further finance companies are sometimes included 
in the source dataset and designated as commercial banks.  
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total number of bank-year observations are 441 for commercial banks (79 for 
listed and 362 for unlisted). 
  Table 2 provides a description of the banking industry in Australia by 
category. As shown in Table 2, the commercial banks are by far the largest, 
possessing 87% of the share of industry assets. Even though Table 2 provides 
descriptions of investment banks and cooperative and specialized banks, these 
were not used in our study. Different categories of banks may be subject to 
different regulation changes, which would complicate this study. The sample in 
our study is limited to commercial banks only. The commercial banks are subject 
to one major change, namely the requirement to implement the guidelines of the 
Basel Accord. Australian commercial banks were also impacted by deregulation 
of the banking industry. However, this deregulation occurred in the mid 1980s 
(see Williams, 1998) and hence does not affect the results of this study because 




5.2.1  Testing of capital management and earnings management 
We use the following model to examine how LLPs are used in capital and 
earnings management. We use four OLS regressions to estimate this model, 
initially using the natural logarithm of loan loss provisions, LLP, as the dependent 
variable, and then using the ratio of loan loss provisions to average loans 
outstanding, LLPR, as the dependent variable. We use LLPR to check the 
robustness of our results. 
 
POST EBT LISTED a POST MCAP LISTED a
POST EBT a POST MCAP a
EBT LISTED a MCAP LISTED a
CFEER a TA a POST a LISTED a




8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ +
⋅ + ⋅ +
⋅ + ⋅ +
+ + + +




LLP = Natural logarithm of loan loss provisions 
LLPR = Ratio of loan loss provisions to average loans outstanding 
ΔLLA = Change between each sample year in the ratio of actual loan losses to 
total assets 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































MCAP = Ratio of actual regulatory capital (primary or Tier I capital) before loan 
loss reserves to the minimum required regulatory capital 
EBT = Ratio of earnings before taxes and LLPs to total assets 
LISTED = Dummy variable (1 if listed commercial bank; 0 if unlisted commercial 
bank) 
POST = Dummy variable (1 for post-Basel regime years 1996–2001; 0 for pre-
Basel regime years 1991–1995) 
TA = Natural logarithm of total assets 
CFEER = Ratio of commission and fee income to assets 
LISTED⋅MCAP = Interaction of type of commercial bank with MCAP 
LISTED⋅EBT = Interaction of commercial bank type EBT 
MCAP⋅POST = Interaction of MCAP with type of regime 
EBT⋅POST = Interaction of EBT with type of regime 
LISTED⋅MCAP⋅POST = Interaction of type of commercial bank with MCAP and 
type of regime 
LISTED⋅EBT⋅POST = Interaction of type of bank EBT and type of regime 
 
The rationale for including the independent variables and the predicted association 
with the LLPs are summarized in Table3. 
 
 
5.2.2  Test of signalling theory 
Ahmed et al (1999) test their signalling hypothesis by examining the association 
of LLPs to one-year-ahead changes in earnings. They use two models. In their 
first model they examine the association of LLPs with the change in earnings 
before and interest and tax and LLPs, after including control variables. Our 
version of this model is shown below. 
 
EBTP a
LISTED a EBT a MCAP a GDP a LLA a a LLPR
6
5 4 3 2 1 0
+
+ + + Δ + Δ + =
 (5.2) 
 
In this model ΔEBTP is the change in the ratio of earnings before taxes and LLPs 
to total assets and the other variables are as previously defined. We estimate this 
model using an OLS regression with and without the variable LISTED. 
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Table 3.   Discussion of independent variables 
 
Variable  Predicted 
sign  Prior research  Rationale for predicted sign 
∆LLA 
Change in loan losses 
to total assets 
+  Ahmed et al (1999) 
Surrogate for level of risk faced by institutions.  If 
loan losses are higher the bank would have to 
increase LLPs to take account of the additional 
risk. 
∆GDP 
Change in Gross 
Domestic Product 
+   
Proxy for change in economic growth.  When 
GDP is growing firms may increase borrowing to 
expand activities. Banks would have to increase 




Ratio of actual 
regulatory capital 
(primary or Tier I 
capital) before loan loss 





Ahmed et al (1999) 
Moyer (1990) 
Beatty et al (1995) 
In the pre-Basel regime, low levels of capital 
may provide incentive for banks to increase 
LLPs since loan loss reserves were part of the 
numerator of the capital adequacy ratio. This no 
longer applies in the post-Basel regime since 
loan loss reserves are now an insignificant part 
of the numerator of the capital adequacy ratio. 
EBT 
Ratio of earnings before 
taxes and LLPs to total 
assets 
+  Ahmed et al (1999) 
In the post-Basel period there is no constraint to 
or costs of earnings management.  This may 
provide an incentive to use LLPs to increase 
earnings. 
LISTED 
Dummy for type of 
bank: takes the value 1 
for listed and the value 
0 for unlisted 
commercial banks 
+ 
No prior research in 
this area has 
examined difference 
in behaviour between 
listed and unlisted 
commercial banks 
Listed commercial banks use the stock market 
as a source of funds while unlisted commercial 
banks do not.  Hence listed banks would have a 
greater incentive to engage in earnings 
management to convey a signal of success and 
stability to shareholders.  
POST 
Dummy for nature of 
regime: takes the value 
1 for 1996 to 2001 and 
the value 0 otherwise 
+  Ahmed et al (1999) 
In the post-Basel period we expect significant 
use of LLPs for earnings management due to 
elimination of constraints to practice earnings 
management. 
TA 
Natural logarithm of 
total assets 
+  Liu and Ryan (1995) 
Larger banks may have higher levels of business 
and hence be expected to have higher LLPs to 
take account of increased activity and risk 
CFEER 
Ratio of commission 
and fee income to total 
assets 
+  Hasan and Hunter 
(1999) 
Higher commission income may indicate an 
interest in non-depository banking activities. 
These banks may allocate additional loan loss 
reserves to provide an image of a safer 
institution providing multiple services. 
LISTED⋅MCAP 
Interaction of bank type 
with MCAP 
? 
No prior research 
has examined this 
interaction* 
This interaction variable is included to examine 
whether listed commercial banks use LLPs for 
capital management differently than unlisted 
commercial banks. There is no clear prior 
expectation.   
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LISTED⋅EBT 
Interaction of bank type 
with EBT 
+ 
No prior research 
has examined this 
interaction* 
This interaction variable is included to examine 
whether listed commercial banks engage in 
earnings management more aggressively than 
unlisted commercial banks.  Since listed 
commercial banks use the stock market as a 
source of funds, we anticipate they have a 
greater incentive to use LLPs to manage 
earnings than unlisted commercial banks.  
MCAP⋅POST 
Interaction of MCAP 
and type of regime 
+  Ahmed et al (1999) 
This interaction variable indicates whether LLPs 
are associated with level of capital adequacy 
differently in the post-Basel regime.  We assume 
the association will be less negative in the post-
Basel period.  
EBT⋅POST 
Interaction of EBT with 
type of regime 
+  Ahmed et al (1999) 
This interaction variable indicates the 
association of LLPs and earnings in the post-
Basel period.  We assume that there will be a 
greater incentive to manipulate earnings in the 
post-Basel period. 
LISTED⋅MCAP⋅POST 
Interaction of bank type 
with MCAP and regime 
_ 
No prior research 
has examined this 
interaction* 
This variable indicates the interaction of listed 
commercial bank with capital adequacy ratio in 
the post-Basel regime.  If the incentive to use 
LLPs to manage capital is lower for listed 
commercial banks relative to unlisted 
commercial banks, we would expect the 
coefficient of this variable to be negative. 
LISTED⋅EBT⋅POST 
Interaction of bank type 
EBT  and type of 
regime 
+ 
No prior research 
has examined this 
interaction* 
This variable indicates the interaction of listed 
commercial banks relative to unlisted 
commercial banks with earnings in the post-
Basel regime.  If commercial banks use LLPs to 
more aggressively manage earnings relative to 
unlisted commercial banks in the post-Basel 
regime, we should expect the coefficient to be 
positive. 
* These variables are unique to this study because we dichotomize Australian commercial banks into listed and unlisted 




In their second model Ahmed et al (1999) use the change in earnings before taxes 
and LLPs as the dependent variable and discretionary LLPs as the independent 
variable. Following their work we use our model shown below. 
 
ULLPMVE a EBTPMVE a a EBTPMVE 2 t 1 0 1 t + Δ + = Δ +  (5.3) 
 
In this model ΔEBTPMVEt+1 is the one year ahead change in the ratio of earnings 
before taxes and LLPs; ∆EBTPMVEt is the current change in the ratio of earnings 
before taxes and LLPs (both divided by market value of equity at the beginning of 
their respective years); ULLPMVE is the unexpected or discretionary LLPs 
measured as the residuals from regression of LLPs on expected change in actual 
loan losses deflated by beginning of year market value of equity. This model is 
also similar to the valuation approach used by Beaver and Engel (1996). 
 
 
5.2.3 Descriptive  statistics 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables. As can be seen from the statistics on the variable LLPR, on average 
LLPs are 0.41% (pre-Basel) and 0.74% (post-Basel) of outstanding loans overall. 
These findings appear to be roughly similar to the US sample of Ahmed et al 
(1999), who reported a loan loss percentage of 0.8%. For unlisted commercial 
banks on average LLPs are 0.13% of outstanding loans in the pre-Basel period 
and 0.17% in post-Basel periods. For listed commercial banks on average LLPs 
are 0.67% of outstanding loans in the pre-Basel period and 0.94% in post-Basel 
periods. 
  Table 5 provides Pearson correlation coefficients of the variables in our 
sample. Among the independent variables, the change in GDP, ΔGDP, the ratio of 
actual regulatory capital (primary or Tier I capital) before loan loss reserves to the 
minimum required regulatory capital, MCAP, and the ratio of commission and 
fees to total assets, CFEER, are significantly and positively associated with the 
standardized LLP variables, LLP and LLPR. As GDP growth increases, 
companies may borrow more money, resulting in banks increasing their 
provisions to take bad debt into consideration. The ratio of earnings before taxes 
and LLPs to total assets, EBT, is significantly and negatively associated with the 
standardised LLP variables, LLP and LLPR. A decrease in earnings is consistent 
with increase in LLPs, since bad debt expenses would be increased. With respect 
to the rest of the correlations shown in Table 5, the magnitude, economic and 
statistical significance of the correlations across the independent variables are 
consistent with similar studies in the literature. Overall, we conclude that the 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6 Empirical  results 
6.1  Capital management and earnings management 
Estimates of the model using four OLS regressions are reported in Table 6. The 
first regression equation does not include any interaction variables. In the second 
equation, two interaction variables, LISTED⋅MCAP and LISTED⋅EBT, are added. 
The third equation incorporates two more interaction variables, MCAP⋅POST and 
EBT⋅POST. The fourth regression includes the previous interaction variables and 
two three-way interaction variables, LISTED⋅MCAP⋅POST and 
LISTED⋅EBT⋅POST. We first ran these four regression equations with the natural 
logarithm of loan loss provisions, LLP, as the dependent variable and present 
these results in Columns 1 through 4 of Table 6. We subsequently ran the four 
regressions with the ratio of loan loss provisions to average loan outstanding, 
LLPR, as the dependent variable and present these results in Columns 5 through 8 
of Table 6. 
  The adjusted R
2 for the first regression with LLP as the dependent variable 
reveals that the basic model, Column 1 in Table 6, explains 25.85% of the 
variation in LLP. There are marginal increases in explanatory power with the 
addition of the dummy and interaction variables: the second form of the model 
explains 26.51%; the third explains 27.99%; and the fourth, 28.95%. The adjusted 
R
2 for the model with LLPR as the dependent variable has higher explanatory 
power overall: the adjusted R
2 for these four regressions are 30.94%, 32.18%, 
33.19%, and 34.12%, respectively. 
  The results in Columns 1 and 5 of Table 6 are for the regressions with 
intercept dummies LISTED and POST but no interactive dummy variables. These 
regressions indicate that on average LLPs, measured as either LLP or LLPR, are 
higher for listed than for unlisted commercial banks and lower in the post-Basel 
period than in the pre-Basel period. The results show a negative relationship 
between the ratio of actual regulatory capital (primary or Tier I capital) before 
loan loss reserves to the minimum, MCAP, and both dependent variables. 
However, the coefficient on MCAP is significant only when LLPR is the 
dependent variable. This provides some evidence of the use of LLPs for capital 
management over the entire period. The results also show a positive and 
significant relationship between the ratio of earnings before taxes and LLPs to 
total assets, EBT, and both dependent variables over the entire period. If banks 
use LLPs to manage earnings, then we would expect a positive relationship 
between earnings and LLPs. Therefore, our findings support the conclusion that 
LLPs are used as a tool for earnings management. (An alternative explanation is 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ΔGDP and TA are included as proxies for economic growth and bank size, 
respectively. The coefficient on ΔGDP is positive for both dependent variables, 
LLP and LLPR, but only significant in the regression with LLPR. The coefficient 
on TA is insignificant in both regressions. The change in the ratio of actual loan 
losses to total assets, ΔLLA, has a positive and significant association with both 
dependent variables. Greater LLPs when there are higher loan losses intuitively 
makes sense, since the purpose of the loan loss reserve is to account for 
anticipated loan default. In both regressions the coefficient on the ratio of 
commission and fee income to total assets, CFEER, is negative and significant at 
the 5% level. Fees and other income received by banks are negatively associated 
with LLPs, implying that loan loss reserves are lower when fees and other 
banking income are higher. For the most part, these results hold in all versions 
(Columns 2 through 4 and 6 through 8) of our model presented in Table 6. 
  In the second form of the model, Columns 2 and 6 of Table 6, we incorporate 
two interaction terms, LISTED⋅MCAP and LISTED⋅EBT the coefficients of 
which estimate the differences in the relationships between LLPs and MCAP and 
between LLPs and EBT. The coefficient of the LISTED⋅MCAP variable is 
negative and significant at the 5% level. This indicates that the relationship 
between LLPs and MCAP is more negative for listed banks than for the unlisted 
commercial banks. The coefficient of the interaction variable LISTED⋅EBT is 
positive and significant at the 5% level indicating a more positive relationship 
between LLPs and EBT for listed commercial banks than for unlisted commercial 
banks. This means that listed commercial banks use LLPs for earnings 
management more aggressively than those that are unlisted. 
  The third form of the model, Columns 3 and 7 in Table 6, incorporates two 
additional interaction terms, MCAP⋅POST and EBT⋅POST. The coefficient on 
MCAP⋅POST is positive as expected, but not significant. This means that there is 
insufficient evidence to conclude that LLPs are used to manage capital adequacy 
ratios differently in the post-Basel period. The coefficient of the interaction term 
EBT*POST is positive and significant at the 5% level. If managing earnings is an 
important driver of LLPs, we would expect to see a larger positive coefficient on 
EBT in the new regime since the costs of managing earnings in terms of adverse 
effects on regulatory capital have declined. Therefore, our results provide 
evidence of a significant difference in earnings management behaviour in the 
post-Basel period. 
  The fourth form of the model, Columns 4 and 8 of Table 6, incorporates two 
three-way interaction variables, LISTED⋅MCAP⋅POST and LISTED⋅EBT⋅POST. 
LISTED⋅MCAP⋅POST is not significant at the 5% level. The lack of significance 
of the LISTED⋅MCAP⋅POST variable shows that there is no evidence to indicate 
that listed commercial banks use LLPs to manage capital adequacy ratios 
differently from unlisted commercial banks in the post-Basel regime. The 
interaction variable LISTED⋅EBT⋅POST variable is positive and significant at the  
32 
5% level, indicating that listed commercial banks engage more aggressively in 




6.1.1  Test of the impact of Tier II capital in the association between 
LLPs and capital management 
In order to test the association of LLPs with capital management measured as Tier 
II capital, which, in the post-Basel period, includes loan loss reserves but is 
limited to a maximum of 1.25% of risk weighted assets, we re-ran the four 
regressions reported in Columns 5 to 8 of Table 6 but now with MCAP defined as 
the ratio of regulatory capital (secondary or Tier II) to the minimum required 
regulatory capital. We present our results in Table 7. For the purposes of 
comparison, we repeat our earlier results for the regressions with LLPR as the 
dependent variable and MCAP defined as the ratio of regulatory capital (primary 
of Tier I) to the minimum required regulatory capital in Columns 1 to 4 of Table 7 
(Columns 5 to 8 in Table 6). The results of our estimation with MCAP defined as 
the ratio of regulatory capital (secondary or Tier II) to the minimum required 
regulatory capital are presented in Columns 5 to 8 of Table 7. Our objective is 
simply to examine whether holding loan loss reserves to a maximum of 1.25% of 
risk weighted assets significantly changes the relationship between the dependent 
variable (the ratio of loan loss provisions to average loans outstanding, LLPR) and 
the independent variables previously discussed. 
  Overall, we find that the change in ratio of actual loan losses to total assets, 
∆LLA, is positive and significant at the 5% level in the presence of Tier I and Tier 
II capital. This shows that an increase in non-performing loans provides an 
incentive to increase LLPs. The coefficient on the ratio of earnings before taxes 
and LLPs to total assets, EBT, is positive and significant at the 5% level in the 
presence of Tier I capital but not Tier II capital. This indicates that banks with 
lower earnings have an incentive to lower LLPs when MCAP includes Tier I 
capital, but there is no evidence to support this for Tier II capital. This is because, 
as Ahmed et al (1999) mentioned, including loan loss reserves acts as a constraint 
to earnings management. (This is not a strong argument since, if this was truly so, 
we would expect EBT to be negative and significant rather than weakly positive 
and insignificant. The insignificant level of loan loss reserves may very 
marginally influence behaviour, but not significantly.) The dummy variable 
LISTED is significant at the 5% level in the presence of both Tier I and Tier II 
capital. This implies that the inclusion of loan loss reserves does not significantly 
alter the association, again perhaps due to the very minimal level of loan loss 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































significant at the 1% level in the presence of Tier I capital and significant at the 
5% level in the presence of Tier II capital. This implies LLPs are deliberately 
understated in the post-Basel regime relative to the pre-Basel regime. This is 
consistent irrespective of whether the capital adequacy ratio is measured with 
respect to Tier I or Tier II capital. Again, the implication is that the very low 
levels of loan loss reserves permitted in Tier II capital are not sufficient to 
significantly alter behaviour. The interaction variable EBT⋅POST is positive and 
significant at the 5% level in the presence of Tier I capital but not Tier II capital. 
This indicates that in the post-Basel period, there is evidence to support 
aggressive earnings management via LLPs, but not sufficient evidence to support 
aggressive earnings management in the presence of Tier II capital. The overall 
conclusion is that there is not sufficient evidence to indicate that earnings and 
capital management behaviour change significantly in the presence of Tier II 
capital. Tier II capital is relatively small, and the limitation of loan loss reserves to 
1.25% of risk weighted assets does not significantly change behaviour or the 
associations previously discussed 
 
 
6.1.2  Test of panel data bias 
In this study our data represents pooled cross-sectional and time series data. As a 
result, the t-statistics could be overstated. In order to take account of this, we 
conducted a panel data analysis using a fixed effects model. The results are shown 
in Table 8. 
  As shown in Table 8, we include a dummy variable, POST, with the value 1 
for observations from the post-Basel period, 1996–2001, and 0 otherwise, ie, the 
pre-Basel period 1991–1995. We include this dummy variable for both forms of 
the dependent variable, the natural logarithm of LLPs, LLP, and the ratio of loan 
loss provisions to the average loan outstanding, LLPR. In both cases, the 
coefficient for the dummy variable POST is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. This shows that, overall, LLPs were significantly lower in the post-Basel 
era. This finding indicates that banks may have had an incentive to understate 
LLPs to inflate earnings. In the fixed effects regressions, the coefficients of the 
other variables were in the same direction and still significant. Hence, our earlier 
findings still hold. 
  We also perform some robustness tests by estimating additional fixed effect 
regressions by including firm fixed effects in the regression. We also perform the 
regressions reported in Table 8 for both Tier I and Tier II as a measure of MCAP 
and then adding year fixed effect as well as both year and firm fixed effects in the 
model. The magnitude and the significance of the key variables reported in the 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.1.3  Additional sensitivity tests 
A final issue relates to survivorship bias. We note that none of the banks in our 
sample filed for bankruptcy during our sample period. There were nine cases of 
mergers/acquisitions during the period of our sample. These nine banks were 
omitted from our sample used in the models discussed above. In another estimate 
(results not shown) we retained these banks in the sample, but created a dummy 
variable that took the value 1 if the bank engaged in mergers or were acquired and 
0 otherwise. The coefficient of the dummy variable was not statistically 
significant. Hence, we conclude that the results are not affected by inclusion of 
banks that have experienced mergers or been acquired. Although this does not 





Our results for the model, Equation (5.2) in Section 5.2.2, with and without 
LISTED are presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9. 
  If signalling is an important factor in determining LLPs, then we should 
observe a positive relationship between the one-year-ahead change in earnings 
and LLPs as reported by Wahlen (1994) and others. The coefficient on the change 
in the ratio of earnings before tax and LLPs to total assets one-year-ahead, ∆EBTP 
is negative and significant at the 1% level. The sign of the coefficient is not 
consistent with the signalling hypothesis in the Australian context. These results 
show that an increase in LLPs is associated with lower reported earnings. Column 
2 of Table 9 shows our results when a dummy variable LISTED is included. The 
coefficient of this variable is significant and positive indicating that listed 
commercial banks reported significantly higher LLPs than unlisted commercial 
banks. 
  With respect to Equation (5.3) in section 5.2.2, the results in column 3 of 
Table 9 show that the relationship between the change in the ratio of earnings 
before taxes and LLPs to the market value of equity at the beginning of year, 
∆EBTPMVEt+1, and the discretionary component of the LLPs is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This result is also not consistent with the 
signalling hypothesis, which assumes a positive association. A possible 
explanation for the inconsistent finding may be that signalling in the form of 




Table 9.   Test for signalling theory 
 
LLPR is the ratio of loan loss provisions to outstanding loans; ΔLLA is the change between each sample year 
in the ratio of actual loan losses to total assets; ΔGDP is change in gross domestic product; MCAP is the 
ratio of actual regulatory capital (primary or Tier I capital) before loan loss reserves to the minimum required 
regulatory capital; EBT is the ratio of earning before taxes and LLPs to total assets; LISTED is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 for banks that are listed on the capital market and takes the value 0 for 
unlisted banks; ΔEBTP is the change in ratio of earnings before taxes and LLPs to total assets one year 
before; ΔEBTPMVE is the change in the ratio of earnings before taxes and LLPs to the market value of 
equity at the beginning of year; ULLPMVE is the unexpected or discretionary LLPs measured as the 
residuals from regression of LLPs on expected change in actual loan losses, all deflated by beginning-of-year 
market value of equity. 
 





























































































***, **, * significantly different at the p = 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels respectively. The absolute values of the  




6.3 Discussion  of  hypothesis 
6.3.1 Capital  management 
Hypothesis H1 postulates that LLPs and primary (Tier I) capital for commercial 
banks will be less negative in the post-Basel regime relative to the pre-Basel 
regime. The MCAP⋅POST interaction variable is not significant at the 1% or 5% 
levels in any of our regressions. This shows that there is no significant difference 
in the post-Basel period. This finding does not support Hypothesis 1. We conclude 
that in the post-Basel period, there is insufficient evidence to indicate a significant 
change in association between LLPs and primary (Tier I) capital after the Basel 
Accord regulations were implemented in Australia. 
 
 
6.3.2 Earnings  management 
Hypothesis H2 postulates that, overall, the relation between LLPs and earnings 
will be more positive in the post-Basel period relative to the pre-Basel period. A 
positive and significant association between earnings and LLPs would mean that 
LLPs are used as a tool for earnings management. In Table 6, the coefficient for 
the variable EBT is positive and significant at the 5% level and the coefficient for 
the dummy variable EBT⋅POST is also positive and significant at the 5% level. 
These findings indicate that LLPs are used as a tool for earnings management in 
both periods, but more aggressively so in the post-Basel period, thus supporting 
hypothesis H2. 
  Hypothesis H2a postulates that listed commercial banks have a greater 
incentive to use LLPs for managing earnings relative to unlisted commercial 
banks. In all the models reported in Table 6, the dummy variable for listed 
commercial banks, LISTED, is positive and significant at the 5% level. This 
indicates that listed commercial banks on average have higher LLPs relative to 
unlisted commercial banks. Further, in the models that include the interaction 
term LISTED⋅EBT, the coefficient for this variable is positive and significant at 
the 5% level. This means that reported earnings of listed commercial banks have a 
significantly more positive association with changes in LLPs relative to unlisted 
commercial banks. Thus, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support 
the hypothesis H2a that commercial banks use LLPs to a greater extent than other 
types of banks in the pre- and post-Basel regimes. 
 Hypothesis  H2b  postulates  that, in the post-Basel environment, LLPs are used 
more aggressively for earnings management relative to the pre-Basel period. The 
POST dummy variable in Table 6 is negative and significant at the 1% level 
across all models. This indicates that LLPs are on average lower after the  
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regulatory change. Further, the interaction term between EBT and regulatory 
regime, EBT⋅POST, is positive and significant at the 5% level in the third and 
fourth models. This indicates that the relationship between LLPs and earnings is 
more positive after the implementation of the Basel Accord regulations. In the 
fourth regression, the interaction term LISTED⋅EBT⋅POST is significant at the 
1% or 5% level. This indicates that listed commercial banks have higher earnings 
relative to unlisted commercial banks in the post-Basel period relative to the pre-
Basel period. We conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support hypothesis 





Signalling theory assumes that LLPs are used to signal future positive changes in 
earnings. Thus, we would expect a positive association between LLPs and the 
one-year-ahead change in earnings. However, the results in Table 9 show a 
significant negative association at the 1% level. This finding contradicts the 
direction of our stated hypothesis. Hence, we conclude that hypothesis H3 is not 
supported. LLPs do not appear to be used as a signalling device, since the 
evidence does not show a significant positive association between LLPs and one-
year-ahead changes in earnings. As stated previously, these inconsistent findings 
may be attributed to the fact that signalling may be viewed as an expense rather 




Much research has been conducted in the U.S. on the use of LLPs for capital 
management, earnings management and signalling. In particular, Ahmed et al 
(1999) examined how changes in the US capital adequacy regulations enacted in 
1990 that ruled that loan loss reserves would not constitute an integral part of the 
required minimum capital influenced banks’ behaviour. There is very little 
research on these topics conducted for other countries. It is important for 
regulators to understand if and how mechanisms such as the LLPs are used as a 
tool to manage capital and to manage earnings to inflate stock prices. Such 
knowledge can help regulators understand if the reported numbers are truly 
meaningful or are subject to manipulation. In this study, using a methodology 
adapted from the approach used by Ahmed et al (1999), we test whether LLPs are 
used for capital management, earnings management and signalling by banks in 
Australia.  
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  We find some evidence to indicate that Australian banks use LLPs for capital 
management but we find no evidence of a change in this behaviour after the 
implementation of the Basel Accord. We also find evidence of earnings 
management behaviour using LLPs by Australian banks, and by listed commercial 
banks in particular to a greater extent relative to unlisted commercial banks. 
Earnings management behaviour using LLPs was accentuated in the post-Basel 
period. Finally, Australian banks do not appear to use LLPs for signalling future 
intentions of higher earnings to investors. 
  Overall, our findings indicate that reported financial numbers may not reflect 
the underlying economic reality of Australian financial institutions based on the 
results from our sample. Regulators may have to take these factors into 
consideration when evaluating overall financial risk. We also note that a new 
Basel Accord was enacted in 2004, subsequent to the conclusion of this research. 
However, the changes resulting from the new Accord have not impacted the 
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